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The Jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Should Outlive 
Defection 
Humberto Briceno Leon*                           
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction 
should outlive the purpose of any state to denounce the 
American Convention on Human Rights in order to avoid 
disadvantageous international rules and circumvent the in-
ternational adjudicative authority to protect victims of hu-
man rights violations. I begin by outlining the Human Rights 
jus cogens nature integrated into the universal international 
human rights law. Following that, I review leading interna-
tional court cases approaching the jurisdictional paradigm 
on treaty defections. Furthermore, I propose two conjunctive 
new elements modifying the mechanical jurisdictional para-
digm: the constitutional internationalized human rights 
treaties and the substantial reviewability of a treaty’s defec-
tion. I conclude by examining the interface concerning the 
American Convention on Human Rights and Latin American 
constitutions. In approaching the Latin American constitu-
tions, I will demonstrate how what I refer to as the “jus co-
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“You can check out any time you like 
But you can never leave”1 
“Hotel California” – Eagles 
 
In 1803, United States Chief Justice John Marshall observed that 
“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.” 2 According to the indisputable universal stand-
ard of ubi jus ibi remedium, for every wrong, the law must provide 
a remedy for the wrong.3 This is most notable in international human 
rights law. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction should 
outlive the purpose of any state who denounces the American 
 
 1 EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL CALIFORNIA (Criteria Studios 1977). 
 2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 3 See Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the Gen-
eral Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). 
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Convention on Human Rights (AMCHR) in order to avoid disad-
vantageous international rules and circumvent the international ad-
judicative authority to protect victims of human rights violations. I 
begin by outlining the human rights jus cogens integrated into uni-
versal international human rights law. Following that, I review the 
leading international court cases approaching the jurisdictional par-
adigm on treaty defections. Furthermore, I propose two conjunctive 
new elements that modify the mechanical jurisdictional paradigm: 
(1) constitutional internationalized human rights treaties and (2) 
substantial reviewability of a treaty’s defection. I conclude by ex-
amining the interface concerning the AMCHR and Latin American 
constitutions. In examining the Latin American constitutions, I will 
demonstrate how what I refer to as the “jus cogens complementary 
jurisdictional model” would operate. 
Given the principle of subsidiarity in the international human 
rights forum, human rights should be safeguarded by special inter-
national bodies when the national or domestic systems are unwilling 
or unable to do so efficiently. 4 No human rights protection, domes-
tic nor international from the Inter-American court, would be avail-
able when the following conditions persist: domestic absence of a 
trustworthy judiciary, denunciation of the AMCHR, mechanical in-
terpretation of the international treaties’ disengagement rules, and 
the lapsation of the post-withdrawal temporal jurisdiction remain-
ing. 
Any state—whether a perpetrator of human rights violations in 
Latin America or elsewhere—would yield an immunity prerogative 
of sorts.5 The victims of those transgressions would be defenseless 
and unable to secure redress.6 Under these circumstances, a rigid 
conventional or contractual international human rights law perspec-
tive would surrender regional human rights values that were poorly 
constructed after the Second World War. 
 
 4 See Humberto Briceño León, The International Criminal Court: Intercon-
nection Between International Bodies in Venezuela, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
261, 296 (2020). 
 5 See generally Rosanne van Alebeek, Immunity and Human Rights? A Bi-
furcated Approach, 104 PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING (AMERICAN SOC’Y OF INT’L 
L.) 67, 67 (2010). 
 6 See Zia Akthar, Acts of State, State Immunity, and Judicial Review in the 
United States, 7 BRIT. J. OF AM. LEGAL STUD. 206, 206 (2018). 
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II.  HUMAN RIGHTS: THE JUS COGENS CHARACTER 
Over the past half-century, the universalization of human rights 
has become a clear phenomenon.7  Contemporarily, prominent 
scholars have highlighted this phenomenon’s effect over interna-
tional law, especially regarding the very classic Westphalian model 
of sovereignty. Indeed, Professor Dworkin has observed that “[a] 
government is illegitimate if it violates the basic human rights of its 
citizens  . . . [and] fails in its duties when it uses the shield of sover-
eignty to decline to protect people in other nations from war crimes, 
genocide, and other violations of human rights.”8 
The sovereignty-based arguments against the applicability of in-
ternationally protected human rights are no longer effective. This is 
the result of an enormous compendium of treaties, customary state 
practices, and legally binding international law that have character-
ized the aggregation of treaties, customs, national legislation, and 
jus cogens.9 
In international law, jus dispositivum and jus cogens are notions 
related to the power of states to conclude international treaties.10 
Some treaties could be left without constraints and thus having the 
character of the jus dispositivum. Conversely, others have the nature 
of jus cogens from which no abrogation is permitted.11 In Article 53, 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Conven-
tion”) codified the conflict with a peremptory norm of general inter-
national law (i.e., jus cogens). 12 
 
 7 See André Luiz Siciliano, The Role of the Universalization of Human 
Rights and Migration in the Formation of a New Global Governance, 9 SUR INT’L 
J. ON HUM. RTS. 109, 109–10 (2012). 
 8 GENERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (Siegfried Wiessner ed., 
2017) (citing Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 2, 17-18 (2013)). 
 9 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: 
Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in 
National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 238 (1993). 
 10 Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and In-
ternational Humanitarian Law, KLUWER L. INT’L, 595, 595 (2003). 
 11 Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 
60 AM. J. INT’L L. 55, 55 (1966). 
 12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969–Apr. 30, 
1970, 1155 U.N.T.S. 344 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention] (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present 
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The international regulations governing jus cogens are all rules 
created for humanitarian purposes— not in the interest of individual 
states, but in the interest of humanity.13 Members of the United Na-
tions have the obligation to respect fundamental freedoms.14 Since 
1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations has been dictat-
ing resolutions defending and promoting human rights.15 In 2001, 
the “Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts” were submitted to the General Assembly. Article 
26 declared “[n]othing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of 
any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation aris-
ing under a peremptory norm of general international law.”16  More 
recently, in March 15, 2006, the General Assembly stated that it is 
the responsibility of all states to respect human rights and funda-
mental freedoms “without distinction of any kind as to race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”17 The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) also decided that states are required to uphold their obligations 
under the United Nations Charter along with other rules of interna-
tional law, including international humanitarian and human rights 
laws.18 
In 1987, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
adopted the concept of jus cogens “from ancient law concepts of a 
‘superior order’ of legal norms, which the laws of man or nations 
may not contravene. The jus cogens norms have been described as 
‘comprising “international public policy.”’”19 The Inter-American 
 
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a sub-
sequent norm of general international law having the same character.”). 
 13 Verdross, supra note 11, at 59. 
 14 See The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, U.N., 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-
human-rights-law/index.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2020). 
 15 See G.A. Res. 1 (I) (Jan. 24, 1946). 
 16 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n 84, U.N. Doc. A/56/10. 
 17 G.A. Res. 60/251 A, at 1 (Mar. 15, 2006). 
 18 Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 
Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 53, ¶ 127 (Feb. 3). 
 19 Roach v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
3/87, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 ¶ 55 (1987). 
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Court’s first reference to jus cogens was in 1993, when it referred to 
the prohibition of slavery as a norm of jus cogens.20  Indeed, it as-
serted “[t]he Court does not deem it necessary to investigate whether 
or not that agreement is an international treaty. Suffice it to say that 
even if that were the case, the treaty would today be null and void 
because it contradicts the norms of jus cogens supervenience.”21 
Later, in 2003, the Inter-American Court decided that, “[t]he abso-
lute prohibition of torture, in all its forms, is now part of interna-
tional jus cogens.”22 Subsequently, in 2005, the court again con-
firmed that 
[t]he above mentioned international instruments and 
its own case law lead the Court to conclude that there 
is a universal prohibition of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in-
dependent of any codification or declaration, since 
all these practices constitute a violation of peremp-
tory norms of international law.23 
The Inter-American Court has found different norms that con-
stitute as jus cogens, such as rules against slavery, torture, any cruel 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, discrimination, 
grave or systematic violations of human rights, and humanitarian 
law.24 The court also found the prohibition against genocide, crimes 
against humanity, forced disappearance, the right to life, and the 
right to be seen as equal before the law as jus cogens.25 
According to Professor Andrea Bianchi of Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, the Graduate Institute of International and Development 
Studies, Geneva, and the Catholic University, Milan, today, the no-
tion of jus cogens is at the heart of the international human rights 
 
 20 Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 15, ¶ 57 (Sept. 10, 1993).   
 21 Id. 
 22 Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103, ¶ 92 (Nov. 27, 2003). 
 23 Caesar v. Trinidad & Tobago, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, ¶ 70 (Mar. 11, 2005). 
 24 DIANA CONTRERAS-GARDUÑO & IGNACIO ALVAREZ RIO, THE 
REALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: WHEN THEORY MEETS PRACTICE: STUDIES IN 
HONOUR OF LEO ZWAAK 113-124 (Yves Haeck et al. eds., 2013). 
 25 Id. at 122. 
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legal system.26 Far from the traditional conception, jus cogens grants 
priority to certain rules over others, whereby human rights, treaties, 
and customary law should prevail over other sources of international 
and domestic law.27  As Professor Anthony Colangelo of the South-
ern Methodist University Dedman School of Law has observed, 
“[s]tate[] Parties have created through their entrance into the treaty 
a customary international legal prohibition that extends into the ter-
ritories of all States, irrespective of their status under the positive 
law of the treaty.”28 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND JURISDICTIONAL 
PARADIGM: THE LEGITIMATE DEFECTION, A NEW 
COMPONENT 
The following are relevant international cases in which jus co-
gens norms could serve as grounds for the ICJ’s jurisdiction. The 
leading case before the ICJ was Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Rwanda in 2006.29 On May 28, 2002, the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) filed a proceeding be-
fore the ICJ against the Republic of Rwanda (“Rwanda”) concerning 
flagrant violations and breaches of human rights and international 
humanitarian law.30 By killing, massacring, raping, throat-cutting, 
and crucifying more than 3.5 million Congolese, the DRC asked the 
ICJ, among other requests, to declare that Rwanda had violated the 
right to life provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide, and other relevant international legal instruments.31 
The ICJ’s original jurisdiction concerning peremptory norms 
has been set forth in articles 66 (a), 64, and 53 of the Vienna 
 
 26 Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 491, 494 (2008). 
 27 Id. at 494-95. 
 28 Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False 
Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 881, 913 (2009). 
 29 Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 
Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3). 
 30 Id. at 11-12, ¶1. 
 31 Id. at 15, ¶ 11(d). 
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Convention.32 Textually, this jurisdiction stands for inter-party con-
troversies to the extent that it involves a new peremptory norm in 
conflict with any existing treaty or concerns a treaty which at the 
time of its conclusion is in contradiction with peremptory norms.33 
The DRC did not allege any of these circumstances directly to reach 
the ICJ jurisdiction in the Congo case.34 
In this case, the DRC alleged numerous international conven-
tions that grant the ICJ jurisdiction to apply and interpret the inter-
national treaty at issue.35 The DRC purported that several interna-
tional conventions provided the ICJ with additional jurisdictions ba-
ses in the event that the Vienna Convention did not grant the original 
jurisdiction; however, those grounds did not convince the court.36 
The ICJ decided the governmental withdrawal reservation is invalid 
not because of the withdrawal purpose, but because (1) the breach 
of procedural rules and Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide was not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Con-
vention; (2) Rwanda’s reservation to Article 22 of the Convention 
on Racial Discrimination concerning non-compliance with a perem-
ptory norm cannot constitute a basis to find the court’s jurisdiction; 
(3) the court cannot assume jurisdiction on the basis of Article 29 of 
the Convention on Discrimination against Women on the ground 
that the preconditions required by that provision for a referral to the 
Court have not been fulfilled; and (4) Rwanda was not a party to the 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
 
 32 Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 66 (“Any one of the parties to a 
dispute concerning the application or the interpretation of article 53 or 64 may, by 
a written application, submit it to the International Court of Justice for a decision 
unless the parties by common consent agree to submit the dispute to arbitration”); 
id. at art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, 
any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and termi-
nates”); id. at art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the pre-
sent Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by 
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”). 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at. 6-10. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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Treatment or Punishment (Article 30.1) and thus the DRC cannot 
invoke that instrument as a basis of jurisdiction.37 The ICJ also de-
nied arguments based on nonexclusive human rights conventions 
that the DRC alleged for the ICJ’s jurisdiction, for example, on the 
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (Article XIV), which did not apply because the 
DRC failed to fulfill the prior procedure for ceasing the court’s ju-
risdiction.38 The court could also not establish jurisdiction because 
of the noncompliance preconditions established by the Constitution 
of the World Health Organization (Article 75).39 On the Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (Arti-
cle IX), the DRC also failed to fulfill the conditions required con-
cerning the recourse to arbitration.40 Finally, DRC’s argument about 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation (Article 14.1) did not appear to establish 
jurisdiction.41 
Regarding its jurisdiction in this case, the ICJ asserted that 
the Court deems it necessary to recall that the mere 
fact that rights and obligations erga omnes or per-
emptory norms of general international law (jus co-
gens) are at issue in a dispute cannot in itself consti-
tute an exception to the principle that its jurisdiction 
always depends on the consent of the parties.42 
In this case, the ICJ, under its own authority, held that the states 
should fulfill their jus cogens human rights obligations but also de-
cided to exclude human rights peremptory norms “in itself” as a ba-
sis for its jurisdiction.43 This international judicial decision raised an 
ostensible conflict: the state’s obligations and responsibilities were 
judicially affirmed, but without jurisdiction to address it.44 This ICJ 
ruling has been criticized, as Proffessor Andrea Bianchi has 
 
 37 Id. at 21-53. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at 21-53. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 52. 
 43 Id. at 52 ¶ 125. 
 44 Id. at 52-53. 
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observed, “[t]he inderogability paradigm and its mechanical appli-
cation may bring about anti-systemic effects and eventually jeop-
ardize even the role that jus cogens may play in its symbolic dimen-
sion.”45 
The academic forum has found the ICJ’s doctrine contradictory, 
as it, on the one hand, employs the traditional jurisdictional para-
digm grounded exclusively in the parties’ agreement regardless of 
jus cogens and, on the other, diverts violations of peremptory norms. 
46 In its purest form, the peremptory model is expressed in non-
derogable legal forms, postulating jus cogens pre-eminence and val-
ues.47 Scholars have called for a more flexible interpretation, pro-
posing a higher degree of effectiveness and coherence.48 
The ICJ held that jus cogens could not be the basis for the court’s 
jurisdiction.49 Obviously, the court was very aware of what it was 
doing.50  In doing so, the court used the same idea of jus cogens 
various times, claiming that it “does not in itself suffice to confer 
jurisdiction on the Court,” 51 “cannot of itself provide a basis for the 
jurisdiction of the Court,” “the mere fact that rights and obligations 
erga omnes,” and that it “cannot in itself constitute an exception to 
the principle that its jurisdiction always depends on the consent of 
the parties.”52 The textual persistence of all those ideas, “in itself” 
“the mere fact”, from the ICJ approach to its lack of jurisdiction 
based on the sole notion of jus cogens, strongly suggests a court’s 
potential receptiveness for jus cogens’ additional components in or-
der to find jurisdiction.53 
An English dictionary defines the words “in itself” as, “[v]iewed 
in its essential qualities; considered separately from other things.”54 
From there, those phrases suggest a question: what did the court 
 
 45 Bianchi, supra note 26, at 503-04. 
 46 See Contreras-Garduño & Alvarez Rio, supra note 24, at 119. 
 47 See Bianchi, supra note 26, at 505. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at 52, ¶ 125. 
 50 See id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 28, ¶ 60 
 53 See id. 
 54 UK Dictionary, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/itself (last vis-
ited May 11, 2020) (defining “itself”‘ as “viewed in its essential qualities; consid-
ered separately from other things.”). 
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attempt to signify by persistently using the phrase “in itself”? I pro-
pose an alternative reading to the court’s traditional doctrine on the 
jurisdiction—jus cogens connection or disconnection. The ICJ left 
open a window when it said that the jus cogens character “in itself” 
did not suffice to confer its jurisdiction.55 Consequently, jus cogens 
together with the right component could provide the basis for the 
court’s jurisdiction. I refer to this alternative understanding the “jus 
cogens complementary jurisdictional model.” 
In this article, I explore the far off-centered notions surrounding 
the use of the rigid jurisdictional paradigm when it is stated that jus 
cogens “in itself” does not serve to establish jurisdiction.56 The new 
model takes this notion and integrates it into the traditional jurisdic-
tional paradigm. As a result, my model incorporates two closely re-
lated, conjunctive elements: first, the acknowledgement of jus co-
gens as constitutionally internationalized in the human rights con-
tained in the AMCHR; and second, a substantive reviewability of a 
treaty’s defection. I consider both elements conjunctively because a 
disjunctive approach would not operate under the plain mechanical 
jurisdictional paradigm. The first element was dismissed disjunc-
tively in the case because jus cogens in itself is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the court.57 The ICJ has disjunctively applied the sec-
ond element, but only on the grounds of its incompatibility with pro-
cedural formalities as required by international treaty law.58 The tra-
ditional jurisdiction paradigm has not directly considered the re-
viewability of the abrogation of  substantive purposes as grounds to 
invalidate a treaty defection.59 
According to the monist view, international and domestic laws 
are part of the same legal order, but international law prevails over 
domestic law.60 Following Professor Bradley, from the dualist per-
spective, international and domestic laws are distinct, and domestic 
law defines the rank of international law within in the domestic 
 
 55 See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at 52. 
 56 See id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 25. 
 59 See id. at 29. 
 60 Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internation-
alist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999). 
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system.61 Concerning the proposed model, the monist and dualist 
doctrines would reach the same practical consequence. Indeed, both 
perspectives would grant the Inter-American Court authority over 
any given party of the AMCHR: under the dualistic view, because 
the international jurisdiction would come from the domestic law 
adoption of the AMCHR prevalence, and under the monist view be-
cause of the plain international law pre-eminence.62 
Once all other conditions required by international law are ful-
filled, which other possible factors could establish jurisdiction on 
the court? Applying the mechanical jurisdictional paradigm to hu-
man rights treaties exclusively would make a denunciation almost 
always be a valid form to defect it regardless of its purposes.63 
Under the traditional jurisdictional model, a denunciation pur-
pose could be to join a more advanced court in conflict with the one 
in charge or to join a more progressive international human rights 
treaty. This treaty defection could be endorsed as a result of compli-
ance of the procedural requirements of the national law and the cor-
relative standards of international law. In this case, the treaty’s with-
drawal would be valid because of the procedural rules, not because 
of its good purposes. Now, the same inflexible traditional jurisdic-
tional paradigm has an inverse component: a counter-jus cogens de-
fection to a human rights treaty pursuing to avoid sanctions and cir-
cumvent peremptory obligations. In the latest case, the denunciation 
would also be valid, regardless of the intrinsic regrettable purpose 
involved. 
In the example, the governmental act issuing the counter-jus co-
gens defection would be heard before an international court. Indeed, 
the ICJ reviewed the Congo case under the procedural international 
law standards stemming from Rwanda’s withdrawal of its prior res-
ervation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention.64 The court 
found the governmental withdrawal reservation invalid because of 
the breach of procedural rules,65 not because of the alleged purpose. 
 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at 13. 
 65 Id. at 29. 
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As a result, the court retained the effects of Rwanda’s original res-
ervation to the ICJ jurisdiction, therefore its lack of jurisdiction.66 
As the “jus cogens complementary jurisdictional model” sub-
mits, the international court would keep competence to review the 
governmental defections acts as the traditional jurisdiction paradigm 
does. To review the defections of an international human rights 
treaty, the new model adds the counter-jus cogens component as a 
new cause of invalidation.67 In this model, the “mere”68 existence of 
peremptory norms is not sufficient to  establish jurisdiction when 
there is a legitimate reason to leave a human rights treaty. Admitted 
as illegitimate, the counter-jus cogens component as grounds to in-
validate the defection, the protection for the peremptory human 
rights survives.69 
Displaying its potential openness to the new “jus cogens com-
plementary jurisdictional model” in the same Congo case, the ICJ 
took modest steps toward the counter-jus cogens factor. Indeed, the 
decision affirmed that the DRC made no objection to the Rwanda 
reservation of the Genocide Convention.70 The court, however, sug-
gested a possible illegal reservation under the grounds of its incom-
patibility with the object and purpose of the Convention.71 In fact, 
according to the conventional rules, the court stated “in the view of 
the Court, a reservation under the Genocide Convention would be 
permissible to the extent that such reservation is not incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the Convention.”72 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY INTERNATIONALIZED JUS COGENS 
AS A FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR 
On February 1988, a meeting convened by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and chaired by Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati, 
Chief Justice of India took place.73 In that meeting, the participating 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. at 50. 
 68 Id. at 52 (the word “mere” was used by the I.C.J in the Congo case). 
 69 Id. at 8. 
 70 Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J at 33. 
 71 Id. at 7. 
 72 Id. at 32. 
 73 Michael Kirby, International Law-The Impact on National Constitutions, 
21 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 327, 334-335 (2006). 
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judges accepted the so-called Bangalore Principles on the Domestic 
Application of International Human Rights Norms.74 Since then, the 
Bangalore Principles have played a significant role in the adoption 
or incorporation of the international human rights law into domestic 
law, including national constitutions.75 International law has en-
hanced constitutionalism and international human rights laws, cre-
ating a globalized phenomenon.76 As a result, international instru-
ments and national practices might influence each other and could 
thus be seen as a model of constitutional convergence.77  Both ele-
ments show a general principle in international law as well as an 
interactive relationship between constitutionalism and internation-
alism.78 
A. The Inter-American Court, the Interface: Constitutions-
International Human Rights Treaties 
Since international law provides rules of rights enforcement for 
the national constitution, the reverse tends to happen as well; some 
domestic constitutions incorporate more precise rules.79 The inter-
relation between international treaties and constitutions is a two-way 
path. The first path is represented by the international treaties’ sig-
nificance over the national laws included in the constitutions.80 The 
international human rights incorporation into constitutions is a pro-
cess that has been exhaustively studied by the legal academy. 81 The 
second path is the reverse: the constitutions’ legal significance into 
the international human rights system. Indeed, the internationalized 
constitution is influenced to confer jurisdiction on the international 
court, as I suggest.82  
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 340. 
 76 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 
19 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 766 (2008). 
 77 Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty 
Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 61, 65 (2013). 
 78 See Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 239. 
 79 See Ginsburg et al., supra note 77, at 83. 
 80 Id. at 84. 
 81 See id. at 88. 
 82 Id. at 65. 
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Today, the human rights system itself can appropriately be cat-
egorized as a constitutionalized regime of international law and has 
“become one of constitutional law in its own right.”83  Then, there 
is a universal crystallization of human rights laws into the constitu-
tions, known as internationalized constitutions.84  Some rights, for 
example the freedom of expression and freedom of religion, appear 
in almost nine of every ten contemporary constitutions.85 
Some contemporary constitutions tend to rank international hu-
man rights treaties over the ordinary norms and, in some cases, 
“equivalent to or even above constitutional norms . . . .”86  As a re-
sult, in Latin America, internationalized constitutions have taken a 
progressive role since the second half of the last century.87 The su-
pra-constitutional or constitutional hierarchy given to the human 
rights treaties began in the region in 1979, with the Peruvian Con-
stitution, followed by the constitutions of Argentina, Chile, Colom-
bia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Venezuela. 88 Also, the 
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica stated 
that the AMCHR is ranked above the Constitution,89 as it also is in 
Switzerland, “where the peremptory norms of jus cogens, but not 
 
 83 Gardbaum, supra note 76, at 752. 
 84 See generally Gonzalo Aguiar Caballo, La internacionalizacion del 
Derecho Constitucional, 5.1 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES: REVISTA DEL 
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 223 (2007) (Spain). 
 85 Ginsburg et al., supra note 77, at 72. 
 86 Neil Walker, Sovereignty and Beyond: The Double Edge of External Con-
stitutionalism, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 799, 815 (2018). 
 87 See generally Gabriel Negretto & Javier Couso, Constitution-Building 
Processes in Latin America, INT’L IDEA DISCUSSION PAPER (2018) 6, 10-11, 
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/constitution-building-pro-
cesses-in-latin-america.pdf. 
 88 Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Interpretación Conforme y Control Difuso de 
Convencionalidad. El Nuevo Paradigma para el Juez Mexicano, Año 9, Nº 2, 
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES DE CHILE UNIVERSIDAD DE TALCA, 
531, 547 (2011); see also Carlos M. Ayala Corao, La Jerarquia Constitucional de 
los Tratados Relativos a los Derechos Humanos y sus Consecuencias, INSTITUTO 
DE INVESTIGACIONES JURIDICIAS, 37,44 (2002), https://archivos.jurid-
icas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/1/342/4.pdf. 
 89 Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica [Su-
preme Court of Justice of Costa Rica], Exp. 0421-S-90, No. 2313-95, in UNHCR 
ACNUR (May 9, 1995), https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documen-
tos/BDL/2012/2844.pdf. 
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the other rules of customary international law, are superior to the 
Constitution.”90 
In Latin America, the AMCHR and the constitutional concordat 
guarantees opened up the domestic legal order to international hu-
man rights law. The Inter-American jurisprudence shows that states 
have repealed and amended laws, including their own constitutions 
as “[t]here is little doubt that this system constitutes the normative 
core of the Ius Commune.”91 
The current interrelation between international treaties law and 
constitutions has prompted international courts to consider the sig-
nificance and legal weight that constitutions could have over the in-
ternational human rights system.92 
In the concurring opinion in Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, ac-
cording to Inter-American Court judge, A.A. Cançado, European 
and Inter-American courts have agreed on limits to state voluntarism 
to safeguard the integrity of the human rights treaties and the pri-
macy of public order over the will of individual States.93  In Caesar, 
the court expressly dismissed the national constitution as a shield 
against the AMCHR.94 Indeed, the court stated that 
[I]nasmuch as it immunizes the Corporal Punishment 
Act from a challenge, the ‘savings clause’ under Sec-
tion 6 of Trinidad and Tobago’s Constitution is in-
compatible with the Convention. Therefore, the court 
orders the State to amend, within a reasonable time, 
Section 6 of Trinidad and Tobago’s Constitu-
tion . . . .95 
 
 90 Ginsburg, et. al., Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Con-
stitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 205 (2008). 
 91 Armin von Bogdandy, Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: 
Observations on Transformative Constitutionalism, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 
109 (2015). 
 92 See, e.g., Stephen P. Mulligan, International Law and Agreements: Their 
Effect upon U.S. Law, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 18 (2018). 
 93 See Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, ¶ 27 (Cancado Trindade, J., concur-
ring) (Mar. 11, 2005). 
 94 Id. at ¶ 133 (Garcia-Ramirez, J., concurring) 
 95 Id. 
2020] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 17 
 
Thus, the three internal state acts that were upheld by the Inter-
American Court to be incompatible with the AMCHR include the 
punishment inflicted over the claimant, the Corporal Punishment 
Act, and Trinidad and Tobago’s Constitution clause.96 
In Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile, the Inter-American court went furt-
her and found four state acts that were incompatible with the 
AMCHR. 97 These acts included an adjudicative act that censored 
the film “The Last Temptation of Christ,” an executive decree law 
that authorized the Cinematographic Classification Council for cen-
sorship purposes, the Chilean Supreme Court decision that confir-
med the censorship, and Article 19(2) of the Chilean Constitution 
that allowed the censorship.98 The four state acts coincidently 
allowed the censorship, the adjudicative act, the decree-law, the Su-
preme Court decision, and the Constitutional clause.99 The Inter-
American court then established authority to review the constitutio-
nal clauses, other normative acts, supreme court decisions, and go-
vernmental adjudications.100 
As a matter of consistency, if the Inter-American court has the 
authority to dismiss a constitutional clause incompatible with the 
AMCHR, the court has the same authority to enforce a constitutional 
rule fully compatible with the AMCHR.101 If a constitutional rule 
fully consistent with the AMCHR constrains the governmental 
authority to denounce the AMCHR as illegitimate, a substantive bre-
ach of internationalized constitutional limitation should be equally 
invalidated.102 
As a highly persuasive authority in International Law, the ICJ in 
Guinea has affirmed this power, claiming that “where a State puts 
forward a manifestly incorrect interpretation of its domestic law, 
particularly for the purpose of gaining an advantage in a pending 
case, it is for the Court to adopt the proper interpretation.”103 
 
 96 Id. at ¶¶ 130, 132, 133. 
 97 See generally Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, (Feb. 5. 2001). 
 98 Id. at ¶¶ 60(a-b, e-f), 104(4). 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See, e.g., Case Concerning Ahmdau Sadio Diallo (Rep. of Guinea v. Dem. 
Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 665, ¶ 70 (Nov. 30). 
 102 See, e.g., id. 
 103 Id. 
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B.   Constitutional Weight on the International Treaty. Latin 
American Constitution: An Illegitimate Defection. 
The jus cogens complementary jurisdictional model is not appli-
cable to every international treaty. For the model to operate, it re-
quires the involvement of jus cogens, similar to the Vienna Conven-
tion.104 It entails that the living constitutional-international human 
rights interface acknowledge the peremptory character of the 
treaty.105 
As discussed above, the ICJ’s holding in the Congo case allows 
an unostentatious window to its rigid jurisdictional paradigm.106 Ad-
ditionally, the same ICJ court in Guinea v. Congo stated that a ma-
nifestly incorrect interpretation of domestic law is for an internatio-
nal court to adopt the proper interpretation.107 In Guinea, the court 
emphasized a particular circumstance in which the International 
Court should correct the local understanding. This circumstance ari-
ses it is when the manifestly incorrect interpretation has the purpose 
of gaining an advantage in a pending case.108 On this question, the 
Guinea case seems to offer a more flexible reading of the traditional 
jurisdiction paradigm than that asserted in the Congo case. 109 
The Costa Rican, Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan consti-
tutional systems have ranked the normative authority of the 
AMCHR  above the constitutional rules.110 Then, hypothetically, if 
a national interpretation from any of these countries wrongly affirms 
the constitutional consistency of the AMCHR’s denunciation, it is 
up to the Inter-American court’s jurisdictional power to correct it.111 
Otherwise, if the court follows the mechanical application of the ju-
risdictional-paradigm, it would just be focused on the plain consent 
of the parties.112 I deeply share Professor Andrea Bianchi’s hope: “It 
is to be hoped that the focus will be shifted from the mechanical 
 
 104 Vienna Convention, supra note 12. 
 105 See id. 
 106 See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 52-53 (Feb. 3). 
 107 See Case Concerning Ahmdau Sadio Diallo (Rep. of Guinea v. Dem. Rep. 
Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 665, ¶ 70 (Nov. 30). 
 108 Id. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See Ferrer Mac-Gregor, supra note 85, at 547. 
 111 See Rep. of Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 2010 I.C.J. at 665. 
 112 See Dem. Rep. Congo. v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at 30, ¶¶ 60, 32, 64, 52, 125. 
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paradigm of inderogability to the more flexible level of interpreta-
tion to ensure that jus cogens can be implemented at the contextual 
level with a higher degree of effectiveness and coherence.” 113 
In 1999, Peru attempted to withdraw its jurisdiction from the In-
ter-American court. The court held that the only acceptable method 
to accomplish such a withdrawal was to completely denounce the 
AMCHR.114 The court partially acknowledged the ICJ’s traditional 
jurisdictional paradigm on the denunciation issue, but also gave a 
step forward to review the denunciation legitimacy by asserting its 
invalidity.115 
In my alternative reading of the ICJ’s jurisdictional-paradigm in 
the Congo case, the AMCHR’s denunciation would be legitimate if 
the Inter-American Court could not find a purpose to avoid the con-
vention’s substantive obligation, or avoid the disadvantageous inter-
national rules circumventing the international adjudicative authority 
to protect victims of human rights violations that are not for pur-
poses of gaining advantages in a pending case.116 Otherwise, the de-
nunciation would be ineffective and the Inter-American Court 
would maintain its jurisdiction.117 To invalidate a biased denuncia-
tion grounded in the alternative model, the court would have to as-
sert its authority to enforce the effectiveness of the AMCHR. On a 
similar tendency, a commentator has noted that “[t]he arguments 
against the legality of late reservations and strategic denunciation 
are especially strong in the context of the ECHR [European Con-
vention on Human Rights] and ACHR [American Convention on 
Human Rights].”118 
On reviewing a denunciation of AMCHR, the Inter-American 
Court provides at least three alternative models. One model requires 
courts to follow mechanically and rigidly the traditional 
 
 113 Bianchi, supra note 26, at 505. 
 114 Case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Competence, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 54, ¶ 40 (Sept. 24, 1999). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Ed Bates, Avoiding Legal Obligations Created by Human Rights Treaties, 
57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q., 751, 785 (2008) (“Many if not all of the points that were 
raised in connection with the legality of late reservations to substantive human 
rights treaties have some relevance here to bolster the argument as to why resort-
ing to denunciation in a strategic way is an abuse of process.”) 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 787. 
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jurisdictional paradigm ignoring the jus cogens constitutionally in-
ternationalized character of the AMCHR as a source of the Inter-
American court Jurisdiction. Under this model, the court would sus-
tain its jurisdiction exclusively on the parties’ consent.119 Another 
approach is to acknowledge the peremptory nature of the AMCHR 
constitutionally internationalized as a framework to review the de-
nunciation substantive legitimacy. Under this model, the court 
would check specifically if the defection is to avoid adverse inter-
national rules or to circumvent its international adjudicative author-
ity, and if it is for the purpose of gaining an advantage in a pending 
case.120  Finally, in view of the denunciation, exclusively based on 
the inconsistency with the jus cogens character of the AMCHR as at 
issue in a dispute, the court could directly ,without any further ele-
ment, founding its jurisdiction exclusively on the peremptory char-
acter of the AMCHR. 
A key element for this article’s purpose is the relatively new 
constitutional phenomenon constraining the potential defection 
from international human rights treaties, restricting the domestic au-
thority conventionally agreed to in order to leave an international 
human rights treaty. On reviewing the Venezuelan defection to the 
AMCHR, the Inter-American Court could consider the second alter-
native, the “jus cogens complementary jurisdictional model.” In-
deed, Venezuela removed itself from the AMCHR, and therefore 
from the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction by denouncing it on 
September 10, 2012.121 Venezuela also withdrew from the Organi-
zation of American States on April 27, 2017.122 Article 23 of Vene-
zuela’s Constitution sets forth the supra-constitutional rank of the 
international human rights treaties,123 thus superseding national 
 
 119 Id. at 770. 
 120 See id. at 782. 
 121 Letter from Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores de la 
Republica de Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Ministry of Popular 
Power for Foreign Affairs) to Jose Miguel Insulza, Sec’y Gen. of the Org. of Am. 
States (Sept. 6, 2012) (on file with http://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/Nota_Re-
publica_Bolivariana_de_Venezuela_al_SG_OEA.PDF). 
 122 Letter from Nicolás Maduro Moros, President of the Bolivian Republic of 
Venez., to Luis Almagro, Sec’y Gen. of the Org. of Am. States (Apr. 27, 2017) 
(on file with http://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/a-41_nota_venezuela_04-28-
2017.pdf). 
 123 Ferrer Mac-Gregor, supra note 87, at 547. 
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laws.124 That constitution, in Article 339, also expressly mentions 
the AMCHR.125 In addition, the right to claim human rights viola-
tions before an international body is set forth in the first paragraph 
of Article 31 of the Venezuela Constitution.126 This self-executing 
norm established a direct cause of action; in other words, it gives 
any Venezuelan citizen the right to go before an international 
body—a court or quasi-judicial agency—to seek relief127 This same 
constitutional clause in its second paragraph defers only to the leg-
islature to implement the domestic enforcement, not the interna-
tional cause of action.128 Therefore, according to the Venezuela’s 
current international public law, those decisions are enforceable lo-
cally but also internationally without any further implementation.129 
Thus, the Venezuelan Constitution has incorporated the Inter-
 
 124 CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA 
[CONSTIUTION] Dec. 20, 1999, art. 23, 339 (Venez). 
 125 Id. at art. 339 (The Decree declaring a state of exception, which shall pro-
vide for regulating the right whose guarantee is restricted, shall be submitted 
within eight days of promulgation for consideration and approval by the National 
Assembly, or Delegated Committee and for a ruling by the Constitutional Divi-
sion of the Supreme Tribunal or Justice on its constitutionality. The Decree must 
be in compliance with the requirements, principles and guarantees established in 
the International Pact on Civil and Political flights and the American Convention 
on Human Rights. The President of the Republic shall have the power to request 
its extension for a similar period, and the Decree shall be revoked by the National 
Executive or by the National Assembly or the latter’s Delegated Committee prior 
to the indicated date of expiration upon cessation of the conditions which pro-
duced them.). 
 126 Id. at art. 31 (“Everyone has the right, on the terms established by the hu-
man rights treaties, pacts and conventions ratified by the Republic, to address pe-
titions and complaints to the intentional organs created for such purpose, in order 
to ask for protection of his or her human rights.”). 
 127 See id. 
 128 Id. (“The State shall adopt, in accordance with the procedures established 
under this Constitution and by the law, such measures as may be necessary to 
enforce the decisions emanating from international organs as provided for under 
this article.”). 
 129 Eduardo Meier García, La Desconstitucionalización del Derecho Internac-
ional de los Derechos Humanos en Venezuela, 17 ANUARIO IBEROAMERICANO DE 
JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL 187, 204 (2013) (“Si bien la Constitución de 1961 
precedía al Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Civiles y Políticos de 16 de di-
ciembre de 1966 y a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos de 1969, 
la Corte Suprema de Justicia no dudó en incorporarlos a nuestro derecho interno 
como norma ejecutiva y ejecutable y reforzada por la jurisprudencia.”). 
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American Court’s jurisdictional authority broadly into the Venezue-
lan international law system. 
To invalidate the defection, in addition to the supra-constitution-
alized rank of the human rights treaty, the proposed model would 
require the review of the denunciation’s legitimacy. Indeed, in my 
opinion, the Venezuelan denunciation was fully illegitimate. On Au-
gust 5, 2008, the Inter-American Court ordered the Venezuelan gov-
ernment to reinstall Judges Ana Ruggeri, Perkins Rocha, and Juan 
Apitz to the bench.130 On December 18, 2008, the Venezuelan Su-
preme Tribunal of Justice held that the Inter-American Court’s de-
cision was unenforceable and requested the National Executive to 
submit the AMCHR denunciation.131 This judicial decision shows 
an indisputable intrusion on the political executive power to justify 
the non-compliance of the Inter-American Court’s decision.132 Be-
fore the AMCHR denunciation was submitted before Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights, two other claims against viola-
tions on the free speech right were highly reported by the media.133 
Subsequently, the Inter-American Court decided the first case on 
January 28, 2009 134 and the second case under its residual tempo-
rary jurisdiction on June 22, 2015.135 Both cases were in favor of the 
plaintiff, but the government completely disregarded the Inter-
American court’s decisions.136 The Venezuelan Supreme Court of 
Justice nowadays totally ignores the Inter-American court judg-
ments.137 
 
 130 Apitz Barbera y otros (“Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo”) 
v. Venezuela, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
1822, ¶ 267(17) (Aug. 5, 2008). 
 131 Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela Sala Constitucional Expediente No. 
08-1572 [Supreme Tribunal of Justice of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
File No. 08-1572] Dec.18, 2008, 1, 25 (“[S]e solicita al Ejecutivo Nacional pro-
ceda a denunciar este Tratado o Convención, ante la evidente usurpación de fun-
ciones en que ha incurrido la Corte Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos, con 
el fallo objeto de la presente decision . . . .”). 
 132 See id. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See Perozo y otros v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 195 (Jan. 28, 2009). 
 135 See Granier et. al. v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 293 (June 22, 2015). 
 136 See generally Meier Garcia, supra note 129. 
 137 Id. 
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The Inter-American court should reinstall the AMCHR for Ve-
nezuela, invalidate its denouncement, and assert the Venezuelan Su-
preme Tribunal of Justice’s denouncement approval as incompatible 
with the constitutionally internationalized AMCHR. 
To abrogate the AMCHR is to directly repeal not only the Ven-
ezuelan Constitutional textual mention of the AMCHR, but also the 
supra-constitutional rank of the international human rights treaty to-
gether with the right to seek relief before the Inter-American court.  
This type of contention against the AMCHR is unprecedented in the 
region, as it intends to erase the human rights contained within the 
AMCHR for the Venezuelan people. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Certainly, the principle ubi jus ibi remedium did not refer to any 
specific remedy, but a right to a remedy. The proposed “jus cogens 
complementary jurisdictional model” is a hybrid among monist and 
dualist international law perspectives. It intends to amplify the tra-
ditional and mechanical jurisdictional paradigm governing the inter-
national treaty law. 
To dispute the prospective lack of protection, the proposed 
model incorporates two conjunctive components to encompass hu-
man rights remedies. These new elements are the internationalized 
constitutional safeguard of rights and the substantive reviewability 
of the treaty denunciation legitimacy as potentially bias state action 
to leave a treaty through a counter-jus cogens intention. The state-
of-the-art international human rights law is propitious to advance. 
Important reflections in the scholarly and the international courts’ 
jurisprudence indicate a possible success. Currently, Latin America 
has developed a profound interface between constitutions and inter-
national human rights law toward Ius Constitutionale Commune, a 
purpose to be progressively accomplished. In close relation to the 
people’s concrete life, the undisputable normative interconnection 
is inter-related to human dignity. While international human rights 
law and constitutions tend to remain the same, interpretations of the 
norms should change in harmony with the constant, but impercepti-
ble changes in the social reality of daily life. 
 
